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Interview with Jiri Pelikan
Could you tell us something of your background, how you became 
a communist, your experiences and what led to your present 
position?
I was born in Olomouc, a small city in M oravia with a mixed 
Czech-Germ an population where, already before the second world 
war, a threat of fascism was felt very strongly. Therefore, as a 
secondary school student of 15, I entered an anti-fascist youth 
organisation “Svaz M ladych” (Union of Youth) in 1937. Together 
with some friends we founded, at our school, a newspaper under 
the naime No Pasaran*, in which we explained to our colleagues 
that the only way to  prevent H itler’s aggression against Czechoslo­
vakia was to stop him and Franco in Spain. Because of this I 
was expelled from the school, but reinstated after protests.
After the M unich agreement and the occupation of our country 
in M arch 1939, both teachers and students understood that we 
were right, and we were able to launch a large movement against 
the fascist occupation. We established relations with workers 
and with the underground communist party  organisation, to which 
my brother belonged. W hen H itler launched the w ar against 
Poland in September 1939, I saw the need to strengthen our 
resistance m ovem ent and I joined the Com m unist Party.
In  April 1940 I was arrested by the Gestapo, together with many 
other comrades, including my brother, and spent five years in 
prison. Immediately after the war I  entered the university and, 
convinced tha t socialism was the only solution for our country, 
was active in the party, working with enthusiasm  for the realisa­
tion of our ideals.
My first conflicts and doubts arose a t the period of the break 
with Yugoslavia in 1948. We knew the Yugoslav comrades as 
good communists, and such people as our then General Secretary, 
R udolf Slansky, who suddenly were branded as enemies. But 
at that tim e we suppressed all doubts, putting all our confidence 
in Stalin and the Soviet Party, which we regarded without hesitation 
as the “ suprem e conscience” . But we could not avoid the conse­
quences: dem oralisation of the party; its growing isolation from
T his interview  w ith the  form er Director-General of TV  and m em ber of Parlia ­
m ent in Czechoslovakia was conducted by A I.R  a t the end of 1970.
* T h is slogan (“they shall no t pass”) was used by th e  Spanish Republicans.
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the masses; more and more power to the bureaucracy; de-political­
isation of the working class, which was asked merely to  produce 
more and not interfere in politics; m istrust among old comrades 
and people in general, and imposition of the Soviet model of 
socialism as the only one, although so removed from our own 
reality, traditions and outlook.
In 1952 I was unable to talk to the people and was searching 
for the explanations. I t was then that I was proposed as General 
Secretary of the International Union of Students to which I was 
elected in 1953. I accepted this work with pleasure, since it 
brought me back to the revolutionary traditions of the student 
movement and I had the feeling that I could really help once 
again to realise my ideals. These ten years (in 1955 I  became 
President of IUS) were among the happiest of my life. I met 
many wonderful people and was able to participate in the fight 
against colonialism in Algeria, Sudan, Indonesia, Guinea, etc.; in 
democratic and national revolutions like in Iraq  and Cuba, and in 
China after the victory of the revolution. I was working with young 
people, who followed their ideals despite persecution and without 
any personal ambitions, and this was such a contrast with the line 
of development in my own country.
A t the same time I realised there were m any contradictions 
between the reality and the official propaganda which revolted me. 
I was particularly upset with the fact that we were protesting 
against fascist persecution in Spain, Portugal, Greece, Iran  and 
elsewhere —  something I did with full conviction —  bu t at the 
same time we were obliged to keep silent about the lack of freedom 
for the student movem ent in socialist countries or about known 
facts of trials and persecutions. For me this was not just a 
formal problem, but the source of moral weakness, since I felt 
that we were losing the m oral right to condem n persecution 
elsewhere.
All these things brought myself and others into conflict with 
the leadership of the Com m unist Party  in 1961, when we demanded 
rehabilitation of Slansky and other victims of the trials, restoration 
of normal relations with the Yugoslav CP, and criticised the 
methods of Novotny. We were punished for this, bu t were 
rehabilitated in 1963 when I  was appointed D irector G eneral of 
Television and elected to Parliam ent.
A t that time the struggle for the renewal of socialism had 
commenced in our country and I  was fascinated by the great 
possibilities of such a m ass medium as television in the activisation 
of the people. I was working with enthusiasm, starting such 
programs as “Res publica” and others, in which m em bers of the
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government or party were invited to answer questions from the 
people. But again, very soon I met the resistance of conservative 
forces and was obliged to fight for m any programs against the 
censorship. But, despite the difficulties, we had the feeling that 
it was possible to achieve real changes, the more so since we 
hoped to be supported by the changes in the Soviet Union and 
other socialist countries and in the international communist move­
ment. In fact, it was all this that led to the “Prague Spring” , 
to that wonderful period when we were again feeling proud to 
be communists, when we had the support of the majority of our 
people, and the conviction that now the chance had come to 
overcome all past mistakes and build a real socialist society, 
which would give socialism its real “hum an face” and wide 
attraction in the country and abroad.
The m ore terrible then was the im pact of the Soviet occupation 
on the night of August 20. I was in the building of the Central 
Committee and saw the distress of Dubcek —  his tragedy was our 
tragedy, the tragedy of all communists who had been always 
faithful to the Soviet Union and were therefore unable to anticipate 
anything like this.
Then a new hope awoke in me when I was among the 1,300 
delegates to the X lV th  Extraordinary Congress of the Party on 
August 22 in the factory of CKD. The discipline and enthusiasm 
of all these people, who came in the course of a single day to 
Prague and gathered in a secret place, their commitment to  the 
cause of socialism, the support given to the congress by workers 
and the country as a whole, the consciousness that the communists 
were expressing the feelings of the people and were recognised as 
the leading force —  all this was a great encouragem ent in the 
first days of the occupation. But then cam e the so-called “Moscow 
Protocol” and it became clear for me that one phase of our life 
had ended and a new one begun —  tha t of the occupation and 
the fight against it.
Briefly, that is my background. W hen I was dismissed from 
my job as D irector General of Television, under “norm alisation” , 
and appointed Counsellor to the Czechoslovakian Embassy in Rome, 
I  declared openly in Prague that I assum ed this position only so long 
as the party  m aintained its position of not recognising the 
occupation as “legal” or as “fraternal help” . And immediately 
after the decision of the CC in September 1969, revoking the 
stand of the Presidium on August 20 and the X lV th  Congress, I 
resigned my post and made a public statem ent about the reasons. 
Frankly speaking, I  did not like the idea of staying abroad, but 
considering the campaign against me in the Soviet Union and
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in the “norm alised” Czech press, I was sure I couldn’t do anything 
useful at home, bu t would only complicate life for my friends. And 
since, as a communist, I was not able to  accept silence or 
resignation and was convinced that we m ust continue our fight, 
which is an integral part of a world-wide movement for the 
renewal of socialism, I took this decision. Only the future will 
show whether it was right or wrong.
How would you describe the present situation in Czechoslovakia?
From the point of view of the relation of forces, after more 
than two years the occupation has achieved its main original aims; 
destruction of the popular movement for “socialism with a hum an 
face”; restoration of a bureaucratic regime which depends only 
on the occupation army and the local police; and installation of 
a party leadership following strictly the line and orders of the 
CPSU. But this achievement still remains in a political vacuum, 
since the m ajority of the population, including communists, rejects 
the “new reality” and is still attached to the ideas of the “Prague 
Spring” . The process of “norm alisation” is still not finished and 
is going on with many contradictions which reflect the perm anent 
fight between different factions in the Soviet leadership. On the 
one hand, H usak and his group is being supported by Brezhnev 
and his group in the CPSU leadership. This group is anxious 
to  develop new contacts with Brandt, Pom pidou, H eath and with 
other western countries (including M adrid and Athens), in the 
hope of achieving economic agreements which would help to 
solve the considerable economic problems existing at present in 
the Soviet Union. This group would therefore like to  avoid new 
political crises in Czechoslovakia and other socialist countries, and 
consequently opposes political trials and b latant oppression.
On the other hand, the “ultras” or stalinists in Czechoslovakia 
are being supported by the command of the Soviet Arm y in 
Czechoslovakia (the so-called “central group”), by certain influ­
ential figures in the Soviet Embassy in Prague and, through them, 
by some im portant circles in the Soviet Arm y and Security and 
the party functionaries in Moscow. This trend demands a stronger 
fight against all forms of “revisionism” , “trotskyism ” , “zionism” , 
etc., and considers the present “norm alisation’ as only formal and 
presses for political trials and repression and the continuation 
of the purges in Czechoslovakia. On the international level, 
this group opposes the “detente” , refuses any compromises over 
the Berlin issue, encourages the intransigent groups in A rab 
countries and is involved in a great effort to achieve the “ revision”
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of the X X th  Congress of the CPSU and further restoration of Stalin 
and his theory of the “strengthening of the class struggle with the 
growth of socialism” . Further developments in Czechoslovakia 
depend on the result of this struggle in the Soviet Union. The 
results of the last session of the CC in D ecem ber 1970 in Prague 
indicate a strengthening of the “ultras” and the growing isolation 
of H usak, who previously liquidated all who might be able to 
support him against their pressure.
But this fight for power at top level cannot change the essence 
of the situation which is characterised by the foreign occupation, 
the dem oralisation of the Communist Party  by extensive purges, 
and the continuation of political repression, together with return 
to the old centralisation of economic, political and cultural life. 
A ccording to official figures, during the last two years the Com ­
munist Party  has lost 474,000 m em bers (327,000 have been 
expelled and the rest, mainly workers, have left the party). The 
average age of CP members is 47, which indicates the loss of 
young people. W orkers who, in the past, constituted more than 
half the membership, now comprise only 26 per cent. Ninety 
m embers of the CC have been expelled from the CC and from 
the party and others have been “co-opted” although there is no 
provision for this in the party’s constitution. The same situation 
applies in other party organisations as well as in trade unions, 
student and youth organisations, and in parliam ent, where more 
than 100 deputies have been expelled and others installed without 
any elections!
Thousands of university professors, journalists, intellectuals, 
teachers, etc., are being sacked without the possibility of getting 
anything else except laboring jobs. Leading personalities of the 
“Prague Spring” are being publicly branded “ imperialist” or 
“zionist” agents w ithout any possibility of defending themselves, 
and political trials are still being prepared. A group of 30 young 
students and workers, accused of being “trotskyists” , have been 
in prison for m ore than a year w ithout being put to  trial.
A t the same time, the resistance of the people is growing; at 
present it is mainly passive resistance, bu t recently, more active steps, 
such as distribution of leaflets and documents, have also been 
adopted.
Some revolutionaries wonder why the people of Czechoslovakia 
did not resist the occupation more forcefully and they believe 
that if this had been done the situation would be different today. 
Can you give your view on this?
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I have expressed my point of view in the the conclusions about 
the results of the X lV th  Extraordinary Congress of the CPC 
mentioned above. Despite my great respect for A lexander Dubcek, 
I consider it his shortcom ing that he underestim ated the danger 
of foreign intervention and refused to discuss any alternative 
should it happen. He had such a deep confidence in the USSR 
that he excluded any consideration of this kind and, consequently, 
took no practical measures. I am still convinced that it was 
possible to avoid the military intervention if Dubcek had declared 
openly to the Soviet leadership (for example on the last occasion 
at the Cierna meeting at the beginning of August 1968), that we 
were for friendly relations, that we had no intention of leaving 
the W arsaw Pact, etc., but that if an attem pt was made to impose 
o ther solutions by force, then socialist Czechoslovakia would 
defend itself. Such a clear stand, together with the mobilisation 
of the masses, the distribution of arms, and the alerting of other 
socialist countries like Yugoslavia, Rum ania and China and the 
international com m unist and democratic movement, would have 
halted the neo-stalinist forces in the Soviet leadership in their 
intention to invade the country, since that would m ean another 
Vietnam  in the centre of Europe. This opinion —  shared by many 
of our comrades —  is strengthened today by our knowledge that 
in the Soviet leadership there were forces which had doubts about 
this policy or which opposed that decision. There can be no 
doubt that the overwhelming majority of the communists and of 
the population would have supported such a firm stand, that 
the prestige of the Com m unist Party would have been strengthened 
and also the international support could have been only stronger.
But this problem  rem ains for continued analysis. W hat is more 
im portant today is the question of what can be done in the present 
situation and in the future. Those who are defending the necessity 
of the acceptance of the d iktat from Moscow of 1968 are convinced 
that we m ust wait on changes in Moscow. We are of the opinion 
that the changes in the Soviet leadership are very im portant, but 
that they will not come autom atically but only through the pres­
sures of all dem ocratic forces in the socialist countries, including 
that of the Soviet people, and of the international communist 
movement. Consequently, we must struggle and act, despite the 
present unfavourable conditions, in order to contribute to this 
general change.
What do you hope to achieve in exile?
We communists and socialists in tem porary exile consider 
ourselves an integral part of a movement, the base of which is
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and will rem ain inside the country. We are only the external 
expression of this struggle, enjoying more possibilities of expressing, 
our ideas than our com patriots at home. Therefore we consider 
it our main task to inform the world about the situation in our 
country, and our citizens about developments in the world, which 
are being distorted and falsified by the official censorship. A t 
the same time, we aim to defend the ideas of the “ Prague Spring” , 
analyse its achievements and weaknesses and place our experience 
at the disposal of the international movement.
To realise this, we publish leaflets and newspapers at home 
and abroad, and the main documents of 1968, such as the “Moscow 
Protocol” , documents of the X lV th Congress of the CP and the 
report of the commission of the CC on the political trials. (These 
will appear in English this year.)
You have been called a traitor by the Soviet press, yet you are 
personally well known to former student leaders, some now in 
high positions in many countries. How do they react to you 
now?
In general, I find a great sympathy and understanding for our 
struggle among those who know my political convictions and 
activities. M any of them regard my present stand as in full 
accord with my previous work and share the same opinion. This 
is true, not only of my friends in W estern Europe, where I must 
now live, but also of those in Africa, Asia and Latin America, 
with whom I have good contacts and a m utual solidarity. Because 
they know me, they don’t believe in stupid accusations of this kind.
You may know that the Communist Party of Australia opposed 
the intervention in Czechoslovakia and continues to oppose the 
results of that intervention. You are probably aware that recently 
Rude Pravo singled out the CPA for attack. Do you know of 
reactions of Czechoslovaks to the position of the CPA and to 
the attacks on the CPA?
The attitude of the CPA is well known in Czechoslovakia and 
appreciated by communists and patriots. In the situation where 
a strong censorship exists, Rude Pravo plays the role of the 
“negative tru th” —  people read the newspaper with the under­
standing that w hat is criticised is good and what is praised is bad. 
The positive role of that article in Rude Pravo consisted in the 
fact that its readers were able to know the position of the CPA.
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The same is true of similar positions of the communist parties 
of Italy, Spain and other countries. Such clear stands as that of 
the CPA are considered by our people as great moral encouragem ent 
and as a real expression of international solidarity. We have 
recently published in our newspaper LISTY —  which goes to 
C zechoslovakia.—  an article about the policy of the CPA , written 
by Mavis Robertson, and its message, sent in Novem ber 1970, 
to the international meeting in Paris.
How do you think communists and other revolutionaries in countries 
like Australia can best help the struggle for socialist democracy 
in Czechoslovakia?
A partial answer to this question was already given by the 
above-mentioned example: to oppose the “norm alisation” in Cze­
choslovakia and in the whole international communist and progres­
sive movement, to support people’s struggle like that in Poland, 
to  reject such oppressive measures as the persecution of communists 
in Czechoslovakia or the trial in Leningrad, together, of course, 
with strong protests against sim ilar trials in Burgos, Los Angeles, 
Athens, Teheran and elsewhere in the world —  to oppose any 
attem pts at revision of the X X th Congress or for further restoration 
of Stalin and his theories and practice and, first of all, to develop 
in their own parties and movements the critical spirit of scientific 
socialism and real socialist democracy: this is one of the lessons 
of the events in Czechoslovakia in- 1968: the deform ations of 
socialism in one country weaken the whole communist movement 
and discredit socialist ideas throughout the world. O n the other 
hand, the elimination of stalinism in one country or party  increases 
the chances for the victory of socialism in the world.
Do you believe that the causes, social forces and ideas which led 
to the changes and events of January to August 1968 are still 
operating in Czechoslovakia? and do you think similar processes 
are operating in other Eastern European countries and in the 
USSR?
The events of 1968 did not come suddenly; they were m aturing 
over many years as the result of contradictions between the ideals 
and the practice of socialism. The “Prague Spring” posed prob­
lems which exist in all socialist countries, of course with different 
degrees of urgency and possibilities for solution. The great 
advantage of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was that, due to the demo­
cratic traditions of the country, the m aturity of its working class.
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the progressive links of its intelligentsia, the high degree of indus­
trialisation and other favorable aspects, it was possible to solve 
these contradictions in a democratic way without any violent 
explosions such as occurred in Hungary and Poland in 1956, 
with the Com m unist Party playing the leading role and with the 
support of a large majority of the population.
But this possibility was destroyed by the foreign intervention 
in August 1968, through which a real counter-revolutionary threat 
was created. A t the same time, as the past two to three years 
have shown, it was possible to crush the “Czechoslovakian experi­
m ent” ; but not one problem which gave rise to the crisis has 
been solved. Today, the country is in  a deeper economic, political 
and moral crisis than it was before 1968, and it is only a question 
of time and favorable international circum stances before a new 
explosion will come. The great problem is that the foreign occu­
pation has fostered nationalism and, because of the discrediting 
of the Com m unist Party, the clash with the bureaucratic-stalinist 
system may take on a violent character, with all the dangers 
that can bring.
Despite certain differences, the same problem s and contradictions 
exist in o ther Eastern European socialist countries (with the 
exception of Yugoslavia which broke with stalinism in 1948, but 
is threatened with other internal contradictions and dangers of 
external intervention, and Rum ania, where Ceaucescu has united 
the country around his independent policy in defence of national 
sovereignty, but with other compromises in internal policy). Thus, 
similar crises exist in these countries and their parties are either 
striving to  find new solutions or strengthening oppression. The 
problem  is that the present Soviet leadership refuses these countries 
the necessary political elbow-room for their own solutions or 
experim ents and threatens to crush all genuine efforts by military 
intervention. But the recent uprising of Polish workers in December 
1970 has shown that even in a country with a Soviet military 
presence political dem onstrations by workers supported by other 
sections of the population can result in considerable concessions 
from the leadership. A nd this process will continue according 
to the pressure exerted by the working class —  in Poland and in 
other socialist countries as well, not excluding the USSR.
W hen speaking of this opposition in the socialist countries,
I would like to stress that its aim is not to overthrow the socialist 
system, but on the contrary, to liquidate its bureaucratic deform ation 
and to give to  it its real hum an face, corresponding to the original 
socialist ideas of M arx, Engels, Lenin, R osa Luxem burg and many 
other revolutionaries.
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